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ABSTRACT 
The Netherlands has a long-standing tradition of protection flood. The article investigates how 
flood control has taken shape over the last two centuries, and addresses the question how 
this phenomenon influenced the spatial appearance of Dutch waterfronts. The hypothesis 
underpinning this paper is that centralization of flood control measures in the Netherlands 
increased the protection level of these waterfronts but also added to the uniformity of coastal 
resorts. Centralization also decreased the responsiveness of flood control measures to local 
needs, which explains the contemporary quest for measures catered to local interests in the 
Netherlands. To do so, the paper explores the major changes in the approach towards flood 
control since 1800, and identifies the spatial impact of flood control measures on urban com-
munities. Additionally, it identifies the major drivers for changes in flood protection measures.
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CONTROL DE LAS INUNDACIONES URBANAS EN 
LOS PAÍSES BAJOS: UNA HISTORIA
Scheveningen and its boulevard by 1900
Source: LC-DIG-ppmsc-05861 from Library 
of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, 
Photochrom Prints Collection
RESUMEN
Los Países Bajos tienen una tradición de larga data en lo que respecta a la protección contra 
las inundaciones. Este artículo investiga de qué manera la protección contra inundaciones ha 
tomado forma durante los dos últimos siglos, y aborda la cuestión de cómo este fenómeno 
ha influido en el aspecto espacial de frentes de agua holandesas. La hipótesis que sustenta 
este trabajo es que la centralización de las medidas de protección contra inundaciones en 
los Países Bajos aumentó el nivel de protección de estos frentes de agua, pero además 
contribuyó a la uniformidad de los centros turísticos costeros. La centralización también 
redujo la capacidad de respuesta de las medidas de protección contra las inundaciones a 
las necesidades locales, lo que explica la búsqueda contemporánea de medidas atentas a 
estos intereses. Para ello, el documento analiza los principales cambios en el enfoque hacia 
la protección contra las inundaciones desde 1800, e identifica su impacto territorial en las 
comunidades urbanas. Además, identifica los principales impulsores de los cambios en las 
medidas de protección contra inundaciones.
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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the obvious necessity of flood control in a country that’s below sea level, local 
communities that have a flood defense within their perimeter do not necessarily welcome 
spatial interventions on behalf of flood control. Recent fortification measures of a large dike 
structure in West-Friesland were compared by local citizens with the infamous German 
Atlantikwall: an extensive system of coastal fortifications, made of concrete and barbed 
wire, constructed by Nazi Germany in the 1940s.1 Such examples demonstrate that an 
explicit concern exists that flood control measures in the Netherlands are unresponsive 
to local needs and desires (CQS, 2012; 2013). 
This paper examines why such a concern exists in the Netherlands - a nation recognized 
worldwide as a roadmap towards efficient protection against structural flooding - from a 
historical perspective. It describes, firstly, the physical form urban flood control took on 
in stages by describing representative examples. Secondly, it explores what drove those 
changes. To do so, I explicitly consider changes in the way flood control has been organized, 
planned and financed.
This paper is focused exclusively on those flood control measures aiming to prevent floo-
ding caused by storm surge. As a result, the geographical scope of study is also limited to 
areas subject to storm surge flooding, and covers the coastal arcade of the Netherlands 
including the tidal inlets of the Rhine-Meuse delta. It covers flood control measures in 
coastal settlements from the navy town of Den Helder in the north to Flushing in the south. 
The study describes the major changes in urban flood control since 1800 in three phases. 
In many scientific works phases in the way the Dutch have dealt with the threat of flooding 
since the middle ages have been identified, like Van der Ham (2002), Van Dam (2010), 
Hooimeijer (2011) and Meyer et al. (2013). According to Van der Ham (2002) the Dutch 
developed a manipulative attitude after the 1800s, after three centuries where the com-
mon attitude could be labeled as offensive. Until the 16th century Dutch efforts had been 
defensive, primarily aiming to prevent land destruction. Hooimeijer (2011) elaborated on 
this approach by dividing the manipulative phase in three sub-periods, based on major 
changes in the disciplines of engineering and urbanism: 1800-1890 (offensive), 1890-1990 
(manipulative) and after 1990 (adaptive-manipulative). For engineering, the main divide 
lies at the 1990s, when the industrial mode of production gave way to the post-industrial 
one. For urbanism, this is the period where modernism gave way to postmodernism. As 
it’s likely that these three periods collide with major changes in the organization of urban 
flood control, this paper will follow these as well.
1800-1890 A REGIONAL APPROACH 
Gradual erosion of the coast and inland patches of land continuously threatened Dutch 
settlements since the middle ages, when the low-lying marshes of the Netherlands were first 
cultivated. A complex of drivers like sea level rise, subsidence and peat harvesting caused 
substantial and accelerating land loss. As early as the 14th century landowners and other 
stakeholders joined forces in order to erect levees and dikes, followed by the construction 
of windmills to pump out excess water in the 1500s (Stive & Vrijling, 2010). 
1  “Voor de deur ligt een Atlantikwall, was dat nou nodig?”, in: Volkskrant, september, 14, 2013.
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Figure 1. The Dutch coast and delta with its settlements
Source: Coastal Quality Studio suministrated by author, N. Brand, 2014.
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The organizations needed to maintain such public works were called waterboards. Size 
and style of management differed from region to region, with cities taking separate chairs 
within the executive board of daily management (De Monté Verloren & Spruit, 1982). The 
waterboards - a form of special-purpose government - developed simultaneously with, yet 
independently from, general-purpose local governments common to medieval Europe like 
localities and counties. They collected their own taxes, either in cash or kind, appointed 
their own officials, and administered justice towards those threatening the protection of 
their territory against flooding.
As a result, a systematic approach towards flood control existed before 1800, albeit on 
a regional basis. As a variety of waterboards took the lead in the organization of regional 
interests with respect to flood control, the appearance of flood control measures seems to 
have differed from place to place. Earthen dikes, made out of clay, dominated everywhere 
but the revetment varied from packages of straw, seaweeds or protective rows of poles (Van 
der Woud, 1987). Cities and settlements developed primarily in the hinterland, with trade 
and industry flourishing where flood protection measures like dams required transshipment 
of goods. Before the 19th century true waterfront towns and cities only existed where the 
opportunity of fast economic profit compensated for the risk of flooding (Meyer, 2010). 
As such cities were thriving on international trade, their waterfronts were typically in 
use for the purpose of shipping. Amsterdam (which experienced accelerated expansion 
from the late 15th century) and Rotterdam (from the 18th century onwards) are the largest 
examples. Both cities are not located on the sea, but respectively on an inland sea and 
within the estuary of the Meuse. These cities dealt with the tidal movements of the sea 
and salt or brackish waters, whereas most other harbor towns in the Netherlands were 
located on fresh bodies of water.
Although no exhaustive inventory of historic urban flood defenses exists, it seems that for 
most harbor cities - those bordering on the inlets of the rivers Meuse and Rhine, or on 
the inland Southern Sea - a combination of an earthen (clay) dike with a protective row of 
poles was the norm. Such flood defenses are seen on historic townscapes and maps. Often, 
the entire waterfront was raised by the use of landfill (Rutte, 2006). Such was the case for 
Dordrecht, where the entire waterfront was elevated. In Amsterdam a dike protected 
the city itself. Rotterdam’s waterfront – the harbors – was elevated as well (Meyer, 2010). 
Possibly the ramparts double-functioned as a flood defense as well.
Flood protection of such waterfronts was likely controlled by city government, as in the 
early modern age such local governments were independent and powerful political entities. 
The city of Leiden, for example, organized all measures on behalf of water management 
within its perimeter, as long as this did not intervene with the regional plans of the water-
board (Van Tielhof & van Dam, 2006). Outside of the city proper, the waterboards reigned. 
The coastal zone itself was generally avoided - which meant that coastal protection was 
only required wherever the coastal dunes were too thin to prevent coastal surge from 
flooding the hinterland. An example of such a project was the Hondsbossche Zeewering, 
for which a stakes-and-thatch combination was used (CQS, 2013). 
It seems such a regional distribution of responsibilities, based on strong local government, 
was moderately successful until the second half of the 18th century. From thereon, severe 
flood events were frequently reported (Van der Woud, 1987): in 1731, 1775 and1825. This 
was caused by a combination of drivers. First of all, economic hardship undermined the 
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means to provide effective flood protection. Secondly, the introduction of the shipworm, a 
foreign species, rendered the use of constructions using wood for flood control obsolete. 
The worms caused tremendous damage to flood defenses throughout the Netherlands.
A discernable response to these flood risk challenges waited until the early 19th century. 
This response can be labeled as the parallel rise of increasingly uniform dikes and the intro-
duction of stone boulevards and as a means of urban flood control (Van der Woud, 1987). 
Boulevards were constructed in Scheveningen, Zandvoort and Domburg. The architecture 
of the waterfront was dominated by the typical eclectic neo-styles that emerged throughout 
Europe, and housed functions like exclusive hotels, salons, restaurants and spas (Denslagen, 
2004; Stenvert, 2004). Boulevards were constructed with an outer revetment of stone while 
earth and clay dikes with stone or basalt revetments became the norm elsewhere. In 1880, 
a dike also replaced the stakes-and-thatch construction of the Hondsbossche Zeewering.
Three main drivers can explain both the timing and the dramatic change in the shape taken 
on by the flood defenses. First of all, from the early decades of the 19th century, the coast 
was discovered as a destination for a new type of economic activity: recreation for the 
privileged classes. In response, resorts developed in the coastal zones throughout Europe 
and beyond, often equipped with a boulevard to stroll on in one’s best outfit (CQS, 2013). 
For the first time in centuries, the lure of the sea drove settlements into flood prone 
areas earlier considered too dangerous for permanent use. This not merely required the 
protection of valuable buildings and businesses against flooding, but also in a shape that 
warranted the competitive advantage of coastal resorts: the attractive strolling environment 
provided by a boulevard. The boulevards were constructed in order to provide the best 
possible view of the sea, and a more comfortable walk than the natural beach would allow. 
A third driver behind the dramatic change in the shape and appearance of urban flood 
protection measures was the geographic upscaling of water management that came with 
the rise of the Dutch national state. Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been 
declared in 1814, centralization truly gained momentum after the 1850s. At first, national 
water management efforts concentrated on the navigability of the Rhine-Meuse delta, a 
matter of economic survival for the new state: the navigability of the Rhine-Meuse delta 
(Meyer et al., 2013). As navigability and flood protection went hand in hand here, both 
were considered to be a national responsibility par excellence. 
To address water management issues – a task of utmost national importance according to 
the national constitution (Van der Woud, 1987), just behind defense of the nation against 
foreign enemies – a national Corps of Engineers was erected (Bosh & Van der Ham, 1998). 
The Corps of Engineers concentrated outstanding expertise, employed wherever national 
interests were at stake, or where the funds or expertise of the regional waterboards were 
unable to sustain spatial interventions. Initially, the efforts of the Corps focused on continuing 
the Dutch tradition of offensive water management: reclaiming land that was lost to large 
inland lakes. One of its earliest feats of arms was the reclamation of the Haarlemmermeer, 
a large inland lake of which the water was lapping unto the ramparts of Amsterdam under 
storm conditions. 
The centralized efforts of water management and flood protection had a severe impact on 
the appearance of urban flood protection measures, but also on the growth and specializa-
tion of urban communities in the Netherlands. The construction of the Nieuwe Waterweg 
(1872) at the city of Rotterdam altered the distribution within the tidal inlets of the delta 
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significantly. And the fact that 55% of the river water was expelled via Rotterdam gave the 
city a significant competitive advantage for trade and shipping, which soon translated into 
feverish building activities (Meyer et al., 2013). While Rotterdam turned into the primary 
national harbor, the construction of a harbor and boulevard for coastal resort Scheveningen 
by the Corps in the early 20th century, contributed to its dominance above other resorts 
in the Netherlands.
Additionally, the national state increasingly employed efforts to incorporate the regional and 
yet independent waterboards. As this met with resistance, and the waterboards possessed 
crucial local expertise that could not be replaced by the Corps immediately (Van der Woud, 
1987), the national state settled for setting legal requirements to which waterboards had 
to comply. This contributed to the standardization of technical design standards for flood 
protection measures nationally. Under the scrutiny of the Corps – which controlled and 
maintained most of the flood defenses considered to be of primary importance, like the coas-
tal and riverine dikes – the Dutch approach of flood control did become more systematic. 
Although flood events continued to occur until the second half of the 20th century, there was 
some general success in reducing their number. Impressive amounts of land were reclaimed 
using stream power. The waterboards kept their independent tax-base and the right to 
appoint their own staff, but otherwise a lot changed in the distribution of responsibilities 
concerning flood control. The waterboards themselves lost their capability to administer 
justice. Other local entities, like city governments, completely left the stage. Increasingly, 
they became dependent on the efforts of specialized water authorities.
1890-1990 NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 
After the 1890s, the Dutch attitude towards water management turned from offensive 
to manipulative. The approach to flood control did not merely become more efficient in 
diminishing the detrimental effects of flood events; it also became more thorough and far 
reaching. Spatial interventions were no longer confined to those spots where flood control 
was needed most. Instead, the entire water system was altered and modified to meet 
required protection standards demanded by national law. 
The 1890-1990 period in the Netherlands is mostly known for its great achievements in 
hydraulic engineering and water management. However, it was also the era when all flood 
defenses considered as primary to the nation’s protection against flooding were heighte-
ned to so-called ‘delta altitude’, and when virtually all the coastal resorts lost their charm.
In the organization, planning and finance of flood control measures the national Corps of 
Engineers became more dominant, building on the changed distribution of responsibilities 
that resulted from the 19th century. 
In the first half of the 20th century centralization became manifest in two ways. The regional 
waterboards became increasingly subject to the requirements and standards of national 
government, and the first grand projects were executed. The Southern Sea Works (1920-
1968), an impressive scheme that turned the rebellious inland sea into a freshwater lake, 
was developed in response to a large flood in 1916. The plan also shortened kilometers 
of primary sea defense to be maintained by the Corps of Engineers. For its execution a 
separate central office was erected: the Corps was considered to be too conservative for 
the construction of such daring measures (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998). 
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The effect on waterfronts varied. For waterfront cities located on the shores of the former 
Southern Sea, like Amsterdam, it meant that they no longer had to deal with the challenges 
of salt water and tidal movement. Obviously some kind of protection was still needed to 
deal with wind set up in the new lake, but not up to the levels required for storm surge 
in large open waters. For waterfront settlements like the naval town of Den Helder in 
the north, the Southern Sea Works resulted in an additional challenge: accelerated coastal 
erosion. All things considered, this meant that waterfronts like Amsterdam’s were released 
from the future interference of the Corps that those bordering on a primary flood defense 
would have to deal with. 
However for many waterfronts the impact of nationalized flood control yet had to reach 
its zenith. In many ways, the 1950s form the true milestone in the historic development 
of especially the coastal settlements. The traumatic flood of 1953, increased centralization 
and national planning, unprecedented population growth and the introduction of new 
technologies in the aftermath of the Second World War contributed to a dramatic change 
in the appearance of the Dutch waterfronts.
The overall effect of this dramatic change can be summarized as follows: flood control 
measures, especially those considered to be of primary concern (and therefore, under direct 
management of the Corps), became increasingly standardized, explicitly single-purpose, 
higher, broader and surrounded by land use restrictions in order to warrant space for future 
broadening. Often, this not only resulted in the loss of the desired direct view to the open 
waters. It also turned the land in the direct vicinity of the flood defense into a spatial limbo; 
a no-mans-land removed from the daily operation of the towns behind them by a higher 
authority that was hard to reach for the concerns of local government. 
In this manner, waterfronts increasingly came to look alike and most lost their appeal. This 
was especially painful for the waterfronts of towns that depended on tourism entirely, like 
Zandvoort, Katwijk, Noordwijk and Scheveningen (Steenhuis, 2013).
The conditions for this dramatic shift were laid in the first half of the 20th century. In spite 
of the increased influence of the Corps and the Southern Sea Works, one could say that 
the flood risk – the chance times the consequences of a flood event – in general increased 
in the early decades of the 20th century. Widespread, ongoing urbanization and lack of 
structural funding opportunities for flood control developed hand in hand. Many cities 
grew beyond their ramparts (which were usually demolished) into deeper flood prone 
areas. The centuries-old phenomenon of subsidence continued, accelerated by mechanical 
drainage. Coastal resorts arose in former fishing settlements like Katwijk and Noordwijk, 
directly on the beach. In Scheveningen urban expansion continued into the dunes, and an 
outer harbor was constructed between 1900 and 1911.
While some areas expanded, exposing ever more livelihoods to the danger of a flood event, 
others marginalized and lost the means to maintain flood protection standards. The rise of 
large port-cities with their expansive harbors, transfer sites, rail yards and related industries 
and services (insurance and banking), like Rotterdam and Antwerp in nearby Flanders, 
soon overshadowed the smaller port-towns on the isles of the southwestern delta, where 
agriculture remained the dominant economic activity. As a result funding for maintenance 
of the dikes diminished (Meyer et al., 2013).
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The global economic crisis of the 1930s and the German occupation in the early 1940s did 
nothing to improve the increasing mismatch between the required flood control measures 
and the available funding. The flood of 1953 that claimed 1500 fatalities in the southwestern 
delta, demonstrated the need for intervention in the most painful way.
Like the Southern Sea Works, the Delta Works (1953-1986/1997) aimed to shorten the 
coastline significantly, so as to diminish the lengths of flood defense to be maintained on 
the highest safety level. In both cases the policies supporting the grand works were syn-
chronized at the national level with economic and spatial policy aims. For the Delta Works, 
this included the advancement of the isles of the southwestern delta via improved accessi-
bility and fresh water supply to increase efficiency in agricultural production. The project 
included the construction of dams on all tidal inlets, with two exceptions: the storm surge 
gates at the Meuse and the Eastern Scheldt river. Both the argument that the grand works 
did more than just provide protection, and the promise of future economic profit, were 
needed to convince the House of Parliament to commit the required funds and political 
support (Kothuis & Brand, forthcoming).2
The flood of 1953 heralded what has been dubbed ‘a safety doctrine’ in the Netherlands. 
After the construction of the Dutch grand works, the nation remained undisturbed by flood 
events for decades. In a flush of victory the lasted at least two decades, Dutch hydraulic 
engineers became national heroes, and the merits of flood control measures above ques-
tion (Heems & Kothuis, 2012). In sharp contrast with the grand works - which had to be 
justified to the House of Parliament by pointing out its ‘multi-purposeness’, both funding 
and political support for spatial interventions on behalf of flood control were given without 
second thought. 
In combination with the grand works, the entire first line of protection had to be raised 
to ‘delta-altitude’. For example, the 6 km-dike of the Hondsbossche Zeewering - a former 
sanddike that was covered with revetments of basaltic blocks in 1880 - was raised to 
11.5 meters above mean sea level. A comparable gigantic structure arose in Den Helder, 
where it dwarfed the town and removed the sea from sight entirely. Wherever the dunes 
were considered insufficient, they were strengthened with extra sand and planted with 
beach grass. In this manner the Dutch coast, which had relocated itself dynamically over 
the centuries, was fixed along a precise location, bringing coastal erosion to a standstill. 
The finishing touch of this practice was achieved in 1990, when the Basal Coast Line was 
recorded in a separate Act.
However, the increased urgency to intervene on behalf flood control was not the only 
driver for the dramatic change that manifested itself on waterfronts hosting primary flood 
defenses. The shape taken on by spatial transformation was for a large part determined by 
post-war planning-doctrine (Faludi & Van der Valk, 2010), which ranged from large-scale 
flood control systems like the Deltaworks, to pro-active policies on agriculture, industry and 
spatial planning. According to Meyer et al. (2013) the approach of the post-war planning-
doctrine was implicitly reductionist. To facilitate governmental intervention on a wide range 
of issues complex spatial and societal phenomena were reduced to manageable and often 
mono-functional spatial units that could be designed, managed and financed separately.
2  This is a preview of a paper (‘Multifunctionele waterkeringen en legitimiteit’) written in collaboration with B. Kothuis for 
the Dutch magazine Watergovernance.
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As a result, the post-war planning doctrine primarily contributed to the decreased attrac-
tiveness of Dutch waterfronts in two ways. The occupation by German forces between 
1942 and 1945 had created the perfect conditions for a tabula-rasa approach. Everywhere, 
19th century waterfronts had been demolished in favor of the concrete fortifications of the 
Atlantikwall. Worse, the city of Rotterdam had been carpet-bombed, preparing it for that 
next wave of architecture fashion: modernism (Denslagen, 2004). National reconstruction 
policies, aiming to house a booming population as fast and efficient as possible with limited 
financial means, replaced the demolished buildings by constructions with a uniform and 
sober architecture (CQS, 2013).
In the practice of flood control, the post-war planning doctrine manifested itself as well. 
While the post-war reconstruction issue was addressed by the Ministry of Housing, the 
Corps of Engineers financed, planned and executed it’s own spatial interventions separately. 
The waterboards, responsible for the maintenance of some of the national and all of the 
other flood defenses, warranted damage to the construction by restricting possibilities for 
co-use in their policies (Van de Sande, 2009). 
So after an initial period wherein the legitimacy of large-scale spatial interventions on 
behalf of national flood control was still un-established, after the 1960s the prevalence of 
Dutch hydraulic engineering above all other spatial considerations was above question for 
several decades. It was in this era that the foundations for resistance against uniform and 
single-purpose flood control measures were laid. 
By the 1990s the Dutch Delta resembled an impregnable fortress. This altered the ex-
perience of the coast, and of coastal resorts specifically, in an extreme way. Waterfront 
communities often lost their most important spatial asset: direct access to the sea. They 
were also faced with building restrictions and land use limitations on, and in the vicinity of 
the flood defense. This caused a general sentiment that flood control was a necessary evil: 
a sacrifice of spatial qualities in order to diminish flood risk. 
AFTER THE 1990S NATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION 
From the 1990s on, the practice of flood control changed significantly. In 1995, several 
experiments started with so-called dynamic coastal management. This resulted in pilot 
projects like De Kerf (1997) and later the Sand Engine (2011). At The Kerf, the sea was 
allowed to enter a designated coastal area in order to create a natural landscape to stimulate 
recreation. The Sand Engine demonstrated how excess sediment supplementation on a 
strategic location allows the alongshore current to distribute sand along the coast. In this 
manner, flood risk is addressed not merely without disturbing the natural environment, 
but by using the forces of nature to do so (Stive & Vrijling, 2010). 
Deeper within the Dutch Delta, such pilot projects received a riverine counterpart in the 
shape of the ‘Room for the river’-program. Instead of heightening and broadening the flood 
defenses bordering the riverbed, the riverbed itself was widened to allow the river to run 
its course in a more natural way (Stive & Vrijling, 2010).
For the waterfronts, this new approach towards flood control manifested itself in the in-
troduction of so-called ‘hybrid’ flood defenses: the dike-in-dune constructions in seaside 
resorts like Noordwijk and Katwijk, and the dike-in boulevard of Scheveningen (Brand, 2012; 
CQS, 2013). Obviously, the use of several materials in the construction of a flood defense 
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was nothing new; but the fact that constructions are wrapped with a certain material to 
make it appear like something else for cosmetic reasons, was. 
Overall, the spatial interventions on behalf of flood control share several properties. These 
can be summed up as follows: implemented with respect for the natural environment; em-
ploying the forces of nature if possible; and executed in such a way that the flood defense 
merges with its context, or is cosmetically altered to go easy on the eyes (CQS, 2013). 
Additionally some of these projects were explicitly aimed to fulfill several purposes in one 
spatial intervention. The dike-in-boulevard in Scheveningen diminished flood risk but im-
proved the public space and boosted the business of neighboring hotels and restaurants. 
The dike-in-dune at Katwijk – currently under construction – also houses a garage, moving 
parked cars from the urban surface above. 
The diversification and increased multifunctionality of flood control measures in the 
Netherlands can be understood by looking at changing planning doctrines, and the issues 
that drove such change (Meyer et al., 2013). 
First off, riverine floods and near-floods in 1993 and 1995, led to the policy-aim to prepare 
the rivers for higher peak discharges, from 12.000 m3 to 16.000 m3 per second. This could 
not be achieved without widening the riverbed itself. House of Parliament enacted a new 
set of acts in order to assess and address the protection standards of primary (national) 
flood defenses (Driesprong, 2004) including those along the coast. 
Secondly, planning procedures in the Netherlands had changed significantly. That spatial 
intervention on behalf of flood control could no longer be accomplished without taking 
into account public resistance on behalf of environmental values had been demonstrated as 
early as 1974. After severe pressure in the media, House of Parliament ordered the Corps 
of Engineers to come up with a half-open storm surge gate for the Eastern Scheldt River, 
instead of just closing off the estuary with a dam (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998).
Although the nature conservation movement was the first to push its concerns, it was by no 
means the last (Stive & Vrijling, 2010). Public resistance manifested itself increasingly in all 
spatial plans alike; and through several Planning Acts, local governments were required to 
organize public participation before granting permits. These acts aimed to empower local 
stakeholders and give local interests a say in zoning plans. Additionally local governments 
were forced to comply with an ever-increasing set of policy requirements from national, 
and eventually, European levels of government.
As a result, planning procedures became increasingly complex, elaborate and lengthy, ta-
king into account multiple considerations before reaching implementation. Although this 
frustrated speedy planning, it also allowed the increased public appreciation for natural 
values and spatial qualities to play a role in the practice of flood control. Likely, the change in 
planning doctrine and practice is the main driver behind the diversification of flood control 
measures in the Netherlands. 
I suspect that elaborate planning procedures are also the primary motivation behind the 
renewed multifunctionality of Dutch flood control measures; and the increased demand 
for them. However, in sharp contrast with the ‘multi-purposeness’ of the Dutch grand 
works, multifunctional flood defenses like the boulevard in Scheveningen or Katwijk were 
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not designed with the primary aim to recoup the costs of implementation. In fact, the extra 
purposes often seem to cost money rather than to make it. 
Likely, this is because the additional purposes were chosen throughout the planning process 
in order to convince local stakeholders to cooperate. Though slow and costly, this pheno-
menon also leads to flood control measures that are responsive to the needs of local com-
munities. And on a larger scale (and long term) to the diversification of Dutch waterfronts. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over the vast majority of the decades stretching from 1800 until today, flood control in 
the Netherlands has been planned, financed, executed and maintained in a highly centra-
lized manner. This explains largely why flood control measures appear to be uniform and 
standardized, and also initiatives for spatial interventions on behalf of flood control meet 
with local public concern. However, since the 1990s the times seem to have changed for 
waterfront communities. Although the initiative to raise the safety standards of (national) 
flood defenses still comes from national government, spatial interventions are becoming 
more diverse, multifunctional and catered to local interests. This demonstrates that though 
flood control in the Netherlands is still centralized, that does not necessarily mean that 
measures that improve flood control have to be uniform and standardized. 
Apart from centralization in the organization of protection against flooding, change in flood 
control in urban waterfronts in the Netherlands has been driven by other factors as well. 
Although such drivers merit to be analyzed more thoroughly, here I’ll suffice with naming 
the three most obvious ones: increased urgency, available means and cultural preferences. 
Increased urgency resulted from a combination of factors in the natural environment on the 
one hand, and intensified use of the flood zone by mankind on the other. The flood events 
that almost inevitably resulted from increasing risk kick started changes in flood control 
measures. Once urgent, change in flood control was then influenced by a second driver: the 
means, including economic resources and available technology. These drivers decided on 
the range of possible flood control measures. Last but not least cultural preferences played 
a role. These impacted the exact design and execution of the flood defense structure, and 
therefore the appearance of flood control measures in urban waterfronts.
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